Globiance / GlobiancePay: Frozen Funds and Criminal Risks

When a payment provider accepts your deposits for months, charges fees on time, but then stops all outgoing transfers — and support goes silent — you are no longer dealing with a technical problem. You are dealing with a pattern. This is what happened to our company, Kadkon Limited, and our $166,000 frozen inside GlobiancePay.

What Happened: Withdrawal Frozen Since September 2025

On September 4, 2025, our company Kadkon Limited initiated a withdrawal of $164,000. In the GlobiancePay dashboard, this transaction is still stuck with the status IN_PROGRESS. The funds never reached our account.

Moreover, analysis of the entire transaction history shows that since July 2025 not a single withdrawal request has been executed. Each attempt ended the same way — with the IN_PROGRESS status. At the same time, incoming payments were processed without issues: the system reliably accepted deposits and charged fees.

In other words, the payment gateway works only one way — money can be deposited, but cannot be withdrawn. If the company really had “technical problems” or partner bank blocks, clients should have been warned in advance. In that case, at least no new accounts would be opened, and no new funds would be accepted.

The observable result is asymmetric: the interface and notifications continue to operate, fees are charged on schedule, but the key process — withdrawals — does not complete. This, combined with the frozen $164,000 transaction, led us to contact both the correspondent bank in Singapore and the police.

Then it became even more interesting. We saw the same data on another domain — v3.globiance.com, which is positioned as a cryptocurrency project. The GlobiancePay login credentials also worked there, and the interface and transactions fully matched. This means that behind the two brands is the same backend and the same team.

It is important to note: our company did not invest in cryptocurrency assets and did not participate in risky “staking” or speculative schemes. We intended to use a regular fiat payment system — to open multi-currency accounts and make international transfers.

The fact that the fiat system login works on the crypto domain v3.globiance.com shows that both projects are run by the same team and owners. The split between “Fiat” and “Crypto” is more of a marketing facade. In practice, it is one and the same product, one database, and one management structure.

This matters because it means the delays in fiat transfers cannot be explained by the “high risks of the crypto market” — the fiat and crypto sides share the same infrastructure and management.

Attempts to Contact GlobiancePay

We tried official channels: contacted support, wrote directly to managers, including Oliver Marco La Rosa. Zero reaction. The reply from the Singapore bank contained a simple recommendation: go to the police. The bank’s own recommendation to involve the police is documented in the correspondence quoted above.

Meanwhile, in Telegram groups of GlobiancePay, life goes on. Long posts from admins appear regularly: “we conducted a six-month investigation,” “payouts will start in Q3 2025 for some groups,” “full access will be restored in Q2 2026.” As of the date of this publication, none of these announced deadlines has resulted in a withdrawal being executed on our account.

Chat admins like Mauricio Carrillo repeatedly assure that “information has been passed to Oliver La Rosa” and that “a reply is coming soon.” In reality, no contact and no specifics ever came. Over nine months these exchanges produced no executed payment and no substantive answer.

It is telling that even employees listed in the support system replied evasively for weeks and then admitted that they “only handle SEPA” and have nothing to do with blocked withdrawals or crypto. Four weeks of waiting — and in the end an admission that no help would come.

Even technical specialists like Alexander Pfau on LinkedIn confirmed that they “sent a message to Oliver,” but nothing went further. Responsibility is blurred, contacts are blocked, and no one takes action.

The practical effect is that no one within the company assumes responsibility for the frozen transaction. Enquiries are acknowledged, redirected, and left unresolved — while the funds remain undelivered.

Key Figures Behind GlobiancePay

LinkedIn profile Oliver Marco La Rosa

LinkedIn profile Irina La Rosa

LinkedIn profile Georgi Georgiev

LinkedIn profile Alexander Pfau

LinkedIn profile Mauricio Carrillo

LinkedIn profile Walaiphon T.

Oliver Marco La Rosa, Irina La Rosa, Georgi Georgiev, Alexander Pfau, Walaiphon T. — they do not hide their roles. Moreover, until recently, the official website had a full “Team” page, proudly claiming “150+ employees worldwide.” Today this page has been removed, but it can still be found in the web archive. And there — the photos and job titles of the very people who now prefer to remain silent.

LinkedIn, however, shows another picture: Globiance and GlobiancePay together have fewer than 50 employee profiles. No “150+” anywhere near. We are not able to reconcile the publicly claimed headcount with the number of profiles that can be verified independently.

Summary and Conclusions

The picture is classic. There is a fiat project and a crypto project, but the team and owners are the same. There are clients who wanted to use a regular payment service but ended up trapped with frozen transactions. There are employees who continue to post reassuring updates in chats. And there is no response at all from the leadership, despite repeated direct enquiries over nine months.

We are not claiming that all these people have already committed a crime — the final word lies with investigators and the court. But practice shows: when police start asking questions, it is not only the owners who must answer. Responsibility can easily fall on accountants, technical staff, and coordinators who “were just doing their job.” That is why it is important that their names and roles remain public. Public accountability for professional roles in a project under active police investigation is a matter of legitimate public interest.

Our position is this: the matter has gone beyond an ordinary commercial dispute. Withdrawals worth hundreds of thousands of dollars remain unexecuted, the correspondent bank directed us to the police, enquiries to the leadership go unanswered, two financial regulators have issued public alerts, and the company’s team page has been removed from its website. In our assessment, this combination is not consistent with an isolated technical failure. The legal qualification of these events is a matter for the investigating authorities and the courts.

Detailed Investigation

A separate independent analysis of Globiance’s corporate structure, regulatory status across 15 jurisdictions, and blockchain transaction patterns has been published by third-party researchers. Its authors describe what they characterise as systematic indicators of financial fraud. We reproduce the reference to that report without adopting its conclusions as our own.

📊 Read the full report: Globiance/GlobiancePay: Analytical Report on Signs of Financial Fraud — includes corporate registry data, license verification, and legal qualification across multiple jurisdictions.

---

Precedents and Real Cases (2015–2025)

For context, below are publicly documented cases in which payment and crypto platforms failed and the matters were resolved through the courts. They are provided as industry background and imply no legal equivalence with the situation described above:

• Wirecard (Germany, 2020) — former CEO Markus Braun arrested, facing up to 15 years in prison; former COO Jan Marsalek remains internationally wanted.
• Payza (Canada/USA, 2018) — brothers Firoz and Ferhan Patel pled guilty; Firoz received 36 months, Ferhan 18 months and forfeiture of $4.5M.
• OneCoin (Bulgaria / international, 2014–2017) — co-founder Sebastian Greenwood sentenced in 2023 to 20 years; Konstantin Ignatov pled guilty and cooperated; Ruja Ignatova is still wanted (FBI “Top 10 Most Wanted”).
• QuadrigaCX (Canada, 2019) — founder Gerald Cotten officially died, but investigation revealed fraud signs; clients lost about $124M.
• FTX (USA/Bahamas, 2022) — founder Sam Bankman-Fried sentenced in 2024 to 25 years in prison for misappropriating $8B; several associates pled guilty.

What these publicly reported proceedings have in common is that investigators examined records held by a wide range of people connected to the companies — not only owners, but also managers, finance staff and technical personnel. Documentary records such as correspondence and system logs are routinely central to that process.

We make no allegation against any individual employee of Globiance or GlobiancePay. Our sole outstanding issue is with the company as our counterparty, and it concerns the non-execution of a payment. Any current or former employee who wishes to comment on the record, or to correct anything stated in this article, is welcome to write to main@affdragons.com.

This article was first published on September 17, 2025 and is periodically updated to reflect new developments. GlobiancePay has not provided any official response to date. GlobiancePay is invited to submit a response at main@affdragons.com — it will be published without modification.